Abstract. Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) is seen as one of the main enablers for secure outsourcing of computation. Currently, there are many different SMC techniques (garbled circuits, secret sharing, homomorphic encryption, etc.) and none of them is clearly superior to others in terms of efficiency, security guarantees, ease of implementation, etc. For maximum efficiency, and for obeying the trust policies, a privacypreserving application may wish to use several different SMC techniques for different operations it performs. A straightforward implementation of this application may result in a program that (i) contains a lot of duplicated code, differing only in the used SMC technique; (ii) is difficult to maintain, if policies or SMC implementations change; and (iii) is difficult to reuse in similar applications using different SMC techniques. In this paper, we propose a programming language with associated compilation techniques for simple orchestration of multiple SMC techniques and multiple protection domains. It is a simple imperative language with function calls where the types of data items are annotated with protection domains and where the function declarations may be domainpolymorphic. This allows most of the program code working with private data to be written in a SMC-technique-agnostic manner. It also allows rapid deployment of new SMC techniques and implementations in existing applications. We have implemented the compiler for the language, integrated it with an existing SMC framework, and are currently using it for new privacy-preserving applications.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) is a cryptographic method for n different parties to evaluate a function (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) so that each party P i provides the input x i and learns the output y i such that no party can learn the inputs or outputs of another party. The first protocols for secure multiparty computation were proposed by Yao [23] . The techniques have been developed since then and several practical implementations of programmable secure computation have been created [13, 3, 8, 7] .
When developing an application making use of SMC techniques (or other, possibly non-cryptographic secure computation techniques), we may want to use more than one technique simultaneously, and/or we may want to defer the choice of particular SMC techniques to a later stage of development. The main reason for this is efficiency -different operations may be fastest using different techniques, even when considering the costs of translating between data representations [11] . Confidentiality policies may compound this issue, stating that different pieces of data must be treated with techniques providing protection against different kinds of adversaries (passive vs. active; the size of coalitions it's able to form). In this case, we may use faster techniques for data needing less protection. Also, in our quest for speed, we may want to try out and profile different SMC techniques; this should be possible without rewriting the application.
We have responded to the wish to simultaneously use multiple SMC techniques by developing a secure computation runtime which is modular and makes the integration of new techniques easy. The application programmer, in order to make full use of the capabilities of the runtime, needs a language to express the functionality of the application and the possible choices of SMC techniques, without being forced to commit to particular techniques too early. The goal of this paper is to present such a programming language, describe its compilation and integration with the runtime. The design of the language has been somewhat inspired by Jif [15] . Several design choices have also been affected by our unique practical experience in developing SMC applications.
Our contribution. In this paper we present an implementation of the secure programming model. Our main contributions include the introduction of protection domains as an abstraction for a set of SMC protocols and the design of a programming language (an extension of SecreC [9, 20] ) that uses protection domains as its foundation. The notion of protection domains is elaborated on in Sect. 2 of this paper. The language is a simple, strongly typed imperative language where each variable and piece of data carries its protection domain as part of its type information. Importantly, our type system supports protection domain polymorphism. This allows the actual choices of SMC techniques to be done after the implementation of the subroutines of the application. This also allows the development of libraries of common privacy-preserving functionalities that can be used with many SMC techniques. To obtain speed-ups from the existence of particularly fast protocols for some common functionality with some SMC technique, our language also supports specializations (full and partial) of polymorphic functions. The language and its type system are described in Sect. 3 .
We have developed a compiler for our programming language that translates programs that use protection domains to bytecode executables that run on a secure computation runtime that enforces the protection domain restrictions.
In this paper (Sect. 4 and Sect. 5), we present the translation of our language to a monomorphic intermediate language; its further translation to bytecode is standard.
Related work. Several languages for programming secure computation systems have been proposed [13, 17, 8, 21, 14] . However, these language do not provide a clear separation of data with different policies on the type system level. Furthermore, some of them are fixed to a single secure computation paradigm.
Our design has been influenced by the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [16] and its implementation in Jif [15] . A label in DLM is closely related to our notion of a protection domain and label polymorphism appeared in Jif. The polymorphism is even more fine-grained in information flow analyses for programs in ML [18] or Haskell [12] . Our choice of following the imperative paradigm was influenced by its ubiquity in cryptographic literature.
Protection Domains
We start by defining the protection domains and their kinds.
Definition 1.
A protection domain kind (PDK) is a set of data representations, algorithms and protocols for storing and computing on protected data.
Definition 2.
A protection domain (PD) is a set of data that is protected with the same resources and for which there is a well-defined set of algorithms and protocols for computing on that data while keeping the protection.
Each protection domain belongs to a certain protection domain kind and each protection domain kind can have several protection domains.
A typical example of a PDK is secret sharing, with implementations for sharing, reconstruction, and arithmetic operations on shared values. A PD in this PDK would specify the actual parties doing the secret sharing, and the number of cooperating parties for reconstruction. Another example of a PDK is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with operations for encryption, decryption, as well as for addition and multiplication of encrypted values. Here different keys correspond to different PD-s. Non-cryptographic methods for implementing PDK-s may involve trusted hardware or virtualization. In general, a PDK has to provide 1. A list of data types used in the PDK. 2. For each data type in a PDK we need:
(a) a classification and declassification functions to convert between public and protected representation of values, (b) protocols or functions that perform operations on protected values
The functions performing secure operations should be universally composable so they can be combined into programs [5] .
Constructing a useful PDK from secure multiparty computation is nontrivial, as many such schemes only support a few secure operations. It may be possible to construct more complex secure computation operations by composing simpler ones, but dedicated protocols have been shown to be more efficient in practice. We have identified several protocol suites that are suitable for implementation as protection domain runtimes with some work, including, but not limited to [2, 3, 6] .
Our programming model includes a special public protection domain that does not apply any protective measures. The public protection domain is useful for working with values like public constants that do not have to be hidden.
Our programming language will allow the application developer to define protection domain kinds and instantiate these kinds as individual protection domains. Each PDK (including the public one) supports a range of data types and operations on those data types; the operations are accessed through system calls whose implementation (as a cryptographic algorithm or protocol) is beyond the scope for application programmer. The data type of each value used in the program is annotated with its protection domain. In order to write generic code, our programming language makes use of polymorphism.
Polymorphic Language
We will now describe the programming language for expressing SMC applications. In this paper, we concentrate on the details related to protection domains. We skip the features that are also necessary for the ease of use of the language (e.g. the module system, multi-dimensional arrays, arithmetic operators and overload resolution), but are orthogonal to the semantics and type system of the protection domains, and are also more straightforward to implement.
Abstract Syntax
The polymorphic language program consists of a sequence of declarations followed by a program body. Every declaration is either a protection domain kind declaration, protection domain declaration, or a function declaration.
Functions are optionally quantified over some protection domains and their body consists of either a system call invocation or a block of variable declarations followed by a statement.
Data types, denoted with t, are not fixed, but definitely include integers int, booleans bool, and vectors of integers int[] and booleans bool[]. Kind variables are denoted with k, protection domain variables with d, function and system call names with f , and variables with x. A special protection domain name public is reserved and is considered predefined. Public data types public t are often written t + for conciseness. In addition to usual WHILE-language constructs the language includes some array operations.
| if e then s 1 else s 2 | while e do s | return e e ::= x | c t | e :: d | f (e 1 , . . . ,e n ) | e 1 [e 2 ] | mkarr(e 1 ,e 2 ) | length(e)
Examples
The first example demonstrates that the selection of protection domains that a given algorithm is invoked on can greatly affect its performance. Consider the task of computing the Hamming distance between two vectors. We can implement this by comparing the input vectors point-wise in domain D and summing the result in a different protection domain DT. The user of this algorithm is free to select both protection domains provided that they support used operations. We will explore the performance of the previous algorithm by looking at two different protection domain kinds, both available on our runtime system. The first is additive secret sharing (among three parties) and the second is XOR secret sharing where data is bit-wise additively shared (also among three parties). Assume that integers are 64-bit wide and both protection domains are run on the same set of physical machines. In this particular case the algorithm performs best if the input is XOR shared and output is additively shared. In this case only 8 communication rounds are required for doing the computation. If both input and output are additively shared then the computation takes 10 communication rounds [4] .
As the second example consider the task of sorting a vector of integers in privacy-preserving manner. The sorting method is polymorphic over the protection domain -the only restriction is that the given protection domain kind supports basic arithmetic and comparison. The generic sorting function operates by constructing a sorting network and obliviously performing compare-and-swap on pairs provided by the network. We have, for readability, in the examples above, used syntactic sugar and operators, such as arithmetic, that we have not defined syntactically. All of those operations can be modeled through system calls. Both of the for-loops can be implemented using a while-loop.
Static Semantics
A polymorphic language program must satisfy a number of conditions in order to be considered valid, to have a (dynamic) semantics, and to be compilable. The main verification pass, which we state as a type system, makes sure that for all function calls in the program, there is a function declaration that matches it. A final pass ensures that all variables are initialized before being used and all (finite) execution paths through function bodies (except the main function) end with a return statement. Here we only consider the type checking phase.
In order to state typing judgments for various parts of the program, we will give unique labels to all function declarations. Let L be the set of labels of function declarations. Let us introduce the following notation:
-For a program P , let pdk(P ) and pd(P ) be the sets of protection domain kinds and protection domains declared in P . For d ∈ pd(P ), let kind (d) ∈ pdk(P ) be the kind of the protection domain d. -For a function declaration f in program P , let arg P ( ) be the list of declarations of its formal arguments, and ret P ( ) be the return type declaration. -For a program P and a function name f let impl P (f ;
L denote the label of a function declaration in P that has the name f and is the best match among all those declarations with the name f , and with the type matching the arguments with protection domains d 1 , . . . , d n ∈ pd(P ) and data types t 1 , . . . , t n , and output with the protection domain d 0 . If there is no such function declaration, or if there are multiple equally good matches, then let the value of impl P (. . .) be ⊥. -For a label ∈ L let δ( ) be the set of protection domains quantified in the declaration of the function with label . -Let body P ( ) be the body of the function declared at the label ∈ L. For a mapping θ : δ( ) → pd(P ), let body θ P ( ) be the body of the function declared at label , where all protection domains d ∈ δ( ) have been syntactically replaced with protection domains dθ. We define arg We have not specified how the function impl P , for finding the concrete location of the function, given the function name and types of the arguments, is implemented. There are multiple possible implementations, for instance, we could return the first match or we could select a match that, in some sense, best fits the template parameters. Regardless of the implementation the type checking judgements remain the same. In our actual implementation, we select the function declaration that (i) quantifies over the least number of polymorphic protection domains, and (ii) out of those, has the strictest kind annotations. If multiple such function definitions match then a type error is raised.
In the type system, the following kinds of judgments will be considered.
-∆ P means that the program P is well-typed in instantiation context ∆.
-∆; P ; θ f means that the function f with label in the program P is welltyped if protection domains in δ( ) are bound to the protection domains given by θ.
function returning a value with data type t 0 in protection domain d 0 , the statement s is well-typed if the variables x i have the protection domains d i and the data types t i . Shorthand Γ is often used to represent the product of types x 1 : d 1 t 1 , . . . , x n : d n t n , and we write G as shorthand for ∆; P ; d 0 t 0 ; Γ . -∆; P ; d 0 t 0 ; Γ B means that, in the given context, the function body B (a system call, or an inner block) is well-typed.
-∆; P ; Γ e : d t means that the expression e, in the given context, has data type t in protection domain d. We write H as a shorthand for ∆; P ; Γ .
The function ∆ stores the instantiations of (polymorphic) functions to given protection domains of the parameters and the return type. More formally, the instantiation context ∆ is a function that maps function name f , return domain d 0 , and domains of parameters d 1 , . . . , d n to pairs consisting of the location ∈ L, and substitution θ.
∆; P ; ⊥ ⊥; ∅ body(P ) ∆ P ∆; P ; ret θ P ( ); arg θ P ( ) body θ P ( ) ∆; P ; θ f ∆; P ; d0 t0; Γ, x1 : d1 t1, . . . , xn : dn tn s ∆; P ; d0 t0; Γ {x1 : d1 t1; . . . ; xn : dn tn; s} The typing rules are presented in the Fig. 1 . There are two noteworthy points. First, our typing rules are not to be interpreted inductively, but co-inductively. Intuitively, we consider a typing judgment to be valid if it belongs to a set of typing judgments where all elements can be justified using these rules and the judgments in this set. There exists the largest such set; it is obtained by starting from the set of all possible typing judgments and iteratively deleting from it all judgments that cannot be justified.
The second point is that these rules constitute the definition of typability, but are not intended to describe an actual type-checking algorithm. The actual algorithm deployed in our compiler has similarities to the instantiation of templates during the compilation of C++ programs.
Similarly to existing languages for programming secure computation, we let the control flow of the program to only depend on public values. This reflects the common consideration of the costs of hiding the control flow as too high to perform automatically (it would involve the execution of both branches, and obliviously selecting the result of one of them). If needed, the programmer has to explicitly encode the branching on private values (or it could be provided as syntactic sugar). Similar considerations allow the pattern of array access to depend on public values only.
For a well-typed program the instantiation context that the program type checks under is not unique. This is because the type checking rules do not restrict the instantiation context in any way but only require that some specific set of instantiations occur. However, the following proposition provides us that, for any well-typed program, there exists the unique smallest instantiation context that the program type checks under. Proposition 1. If the program P is well-typed such that ∆ P and ∆ P then ∆ ∩ ∆ P .
Proof. By structural recursion on the type checking rules.
Incompleteness Due to Ambiguity Notice that, according to the type checking rules, it's possible to construct a program that is well-typed but, in practice, should be rejected by the compiler as evaluating it would leads to ambiguous behavior. Consider a function ∀d.f():d int[] polymorphic in the return type, that is invoked in context that does not provide a concrete protection domain. For example, length(f()), this expression is well-typed, but the concrete protection domain that the polymorphic function needs to return can be picked arbitrarily. In practice we reject programs that lead to this kind of ambiguous behavior. This issue seems to rise in static semantics of many programming languages that allow qualified types [10] and, according to our knowledge, there is no elegant solution [22].
Dynamic Semantics
We will in the following define a small-step operational semantics of the polymorphic language. To define the small-step transition rules of the language we extend the abstract syntax of expressions with all possible values that variables can take: e ::= . . .
Values carry the protection domain and are pairs consisting of a protection domain d, and some representation v ∈ Val (for simplicity of treatment, we conflate all data types to a single set Val here) which is left abstract. Public values public v may be denoted as v + for conciseness. Arrays are denoted with a, indices with i, and length of array with l. Let a i be a value that is stored in the cell with coordinate i in the array a. Let a[i → v] denote array that is otherwise equal to a, except that the cell at coordinate i contains the value v. Let length(a) be the length l of the array a. Let mkarr (v, l) be array with length l, where all cells contain the value v. We assume that if an index of an array is not in valid range it is mapped to that ranged in some manner. A special bottom value ⊥ ∈ Val is used to denote uninitialized or undefined values.
In order to specify the evaluation order we define statement evaluation context S and expression evaluation contexts E using a simple grammar in Fig. 2 . We choose to evaluate expressions from left to right in a deterministic order. For every evaluation context we define a mapping from expressions to either statements or expressions respectively. The definitions of the functions S
The semantics is a set of triples that we denote C
• is the configuration after making a single step in the program, and κ is the action performed during that step. If the step was not an invocation of a system call, then the action is empty (denoted either with τ or by simply omitting it). If the step consisted of making a system call with name f , arguments v 1 , . . . , v n in protection domains d 1 , . . . , d n , returning a value v 0 in the protection domain d 0 then we denote the action with
The only source of system calls in the polymorphic language is the syscall construct.
A configuration C = c 1 : . . . : c n : c n+1 consists of a list of stack frames, where every frame c i , other than the last, consists of a statement evaluation context S, return domain d, and local environment γ. A configuration always consists of at least one stack frame. The context S acts as a return position, and if the current procedure returns we plug the returned value into the context S of the previous stack frame. The last stack frame c n+1 does not contain the return position.
The program configuration C • is either a program P or a pair of configuration and statement C, s . The target configuration C
• of transition may be a regular program configuration C
• or a configuration C if the evaluation halts. With such set-up, the definition of the triples C 
Trace Semantics
Trace is a sequence of program states that are connected by actions. Individual states of trace are hidden and denoted with • as we are only concerned about which sequences of actions a program may perform. Traces may be empty, finite or infinite. For example, configuration in final state has trace •, but a infinite trace • → • . . . corresponds to configuration which performs no actions and loops indefinitely. A set of all finite traces T * , infinite traces T ω , and arbitrary traces T ∞ are defined over the set of labels A corresponding to actions (i.e. system calls) a program may perform.
Trace semantics of a well-typed program ∆ P is defined by a set of sequences of labels P ⊆ T ∞ by collecting all finite and infinite traces starting with the program configuration P . All finite traces have to stop in some configuration C as we assume that the body of the program does not contain a return statement.
Security of Information Flow
The protection domains give us a simple discipline for information flow control. An observer able to access data only in certain protection domains will learn nothing about data in other domains, as long as no operation explicitly transfers data between these protection domains. The semantics (3) specifies the order in which system calls are made. The actual execution of the program depends on the implementations of these system calls. The semantics f of an arity-k system call f is a function with the type
where PD is the set of all protection domains and Val is the set of possible values the program operates on. The result of the system call depends not only on its arguments and their (and the result's) protection domains, but also (e.g. when inputting values) on the outside environment. We let W denote the set of possible states of the environment. This state can change due to the system call, thus codomain of f also contains W.
The initial state of the environment is distributed according to W ∈ D(W), this distribution is known to everyone (D(X) denotes the set of probability distributions over the set X). The distribution W and the semantics of system calls define a probability distribution over the set of traces P . In this setting, the semantics of all system calls can be assumed to be deterministic, as the random coins they might use may be considered to be a part of W.
To speak about information flow security, we partition the set of protection domains into "low" and "high" domains: PD = PD L∪ PD H , with public ∈ PD L . Similarly, the state of the world has "low" and "high" part: W = W L ×W H ; these parts must be independent in the initial distribution W. For each label κ ≡ v 0 = f (d 0 , d 1 , v 1 , . . . , d n , v n ) we define its low-slice κ by replacing each v i by a placeholder * iff d i ∈ PD H ; this definition straightforwardly extends to traces. A label κ is a declassification label if d 0 ∈ PD L , but d i ∈ PD H for some i. We require that the semantics of system calls f only has the information flows that we expect it to have: the low-part of the state of the environment output by f may only depend on the low inputs to f , and the value v 0 output by f may depend on the high-part of the state of the environment only if d 0 ∈ PD H .
We can show that unless κ is a declassification label, the execution of a system call labeled κ does not increase the low-adversary's (that can observe the low-slices of traces) knowledge about the high-part of the initial state of the environment. We define a probabilistic notion of the knowledge -similar to [1] -of the adversary after observing the low-slice of the trace so far. The adversary's knowledge KN T ,w L P is a probability distribution that assigns to each pair (w , T ), where w ∈ W and T is a trace, the probability that the execution of the program P started in state w and proceeded along the trace T , given that the low-slice of the trace so far has been T and the initial low-part of the state of the environment was w L . We can show (see Appendix D) that if κ is not a declassification label, then KN
Monomorphic Language
The monomorphic language is a WHILE-language with functions and PDs. The notion of protection domains remains in the language but the run-time behavior of the language no longer depends on them. All dynamic dispatches have been resolved; the function calls in the monomorphic language are statically bound. The majority of program optimizations and static analysis should be done at the level of the monomorphic language.
Syntactically the target language has only few differences from the high level language (1) and (2). The first is that functions can no longer be polymorphically quantified over protection domains, and every function definition is uniquely indexed to distinguish between the instances of the same polymorphic language function. We also assume that every function call refers to the unique index ι. Another syntactic difference is that qualified expressions are not present in the monomorphic language.
Dynamic Semantics
Operational semantics of the monomorphic language (Appendix B) is defined in very similar style to the polymorphic language semantics. A major difference is that environment no longer stores domain types of values, and due to the lack of dynamic dispatch, the semantic rules do not depend on the instance environment ∆. We shall not define all of the language concepts because they are almost identical to those presented for the polymorphic language semantics.
Trace semantics of the monomorphic language program is defined using the same notion of traces as defined for the polymorphic language. It's possible because the traces hide the individual configurations between the transitions, but the labels are same between the language semantics. Trace semantics of monomorphic language program P is defined by a set of sequences of labels P ⊆ T ∞ analogously to the polymorphic language trace semantics.
Translation
This section covers a type-directed method for translating programs of the polymorphic language to the programs of the monomorphic language. The typedirected translation methods model compilation to intermediate representation.
Translation Methods
Type-directed methods for translating statements are in the form ∆; P ; d 0 t 0 ; Γ s s where s is a statement of the polymorphic language and s is a statement of the monomorphic language. The context ∆ contains instantiations of functions to some particular protection domains, and Γ is the type environment for variables, d 0 and t 0 denote the return type of the current function. Translation rules of expressions are in the form ∆; P ; Γ e e : d t, where e is expression of the polymorphic language, e is expression of the monomorphic language, d is the domain type, and t is the data type of the expression.
The translation methods follow the type checking rules directly. There are, however, few notable points. The first difference is that in the monomorphic language we refer to the concrete instances of polymorphic functions using the index ι = ( , θ) where is the label of function in the polymorphic language and θ is the substitution to concrete protection domains. Due to unambiguity this index is unique for every function call. Second notable point is that the translation does not always produce a well-typed monomorphic language program -the instantiation context might contain instantiations that do not type. If given smallest ∆ such that ∆ P P then P type checks.
Functional Correctness
Informally we wish to show that the original program and the translated program give rise to the same set of sequences of system calls. First we will define equivalence relation between the polymorphic and monomorphic language program configurations. Next we will assert a lemma that intuitively states that equivalent program configurations will eventually transition into equivalent configurations. Finally, we will state a theorem to establish that the translation to monomorphic form preserves semantics.
To establish an equivalence relation between polymorphic and monomorphic language configurations we define equivalence relation between: environments, singleton configurations, and program configurations. Two environments Γ γ ≡ γ are equivalent under the given type environment Γ if, for every (
Additionally, if a variable does not occur in the type environment Γ it must not occur in either of the environments. Given equivalent environments the equivalence of singleton configurations rises naturally, and equivalence of configurations and program configurations follows from statement translation rules.
We write C
• κ * → C • , for both polymorphic and monomorphic program configurations, if it's possible to transition from the source configuration to the destination configuration by performing the action κ followed and preceded by some finite number of empty transitions. For empty transitions we allow that C
Lemma 1 (Weak bisimulation). Let G be statement type checking context. For every two equivalent program configurations G C • ≡ C • the following conditions hold:
1. For every label κ and configuration
For every label κ and configuration
Proof. By structural recursion over the translation methods.
Finite traces are said to be equivalent if they are equal without their empty transitions. We say that two infinite traces T, T ⊆ T ω are equivalent T ∼ = T if for every prefix of T there exists equivalent prefix of T . Notice that, according to our definition, a finite trace can never be equivalent to an infinite trace. This matches with intuition that, given enough time, a non-terminating program can always be distinguished from a terminating program no matter the system calls they perform. Sets of traces are equivalent if for every trace from one set there exists equivalent trace in another. More formally T ∼ = T if for every T ∈ T there exists T ∈ T such that T ∼ = T , and for every T ∈ T there exists T ∈ T such that T ∼ = T . Theorem 1. For every well-typed polymorphic language program ∆ P and a monomorphic language program P if ∆ P P then the trace semantics of the two programs are equivalent P ∼ = P .
Security
The secure information flow property we stated in Sect. 3.6 was specified in terms of the set of program traces making up the semantics of the program. In particular, the property did not directly refer to the program that generated those traces. One could then also ask for a particular program in the intermediate language whether it satisfies that information flow property; some of them would satisfy it for a particular choice of PD L , while the others wouldn't. But as the translation from the polymorphic language to the monomorphic language preserves the semantics of the program, we immediately obtain that the translation of any polymorphic language program satisfies the secure information flow property stated in Sect. 3.6.
Implementation
Our compiler translates from the described polymorphic language to the described monomorphic language, performs certain program optimizations on the translated code, and then translates it further to a bytecode that is handled by our distributed SMC runtime. The runtime interfaces with PDK implementations (using system calls) that are also distributed among the nodes executing the runtime. Each PD requires a number of nodes (that we call "roles" by an analogue with cryptographic protocols) to run securely. To deploy an application, we select for each role of each PD in that application a physical node that executes the code for that role in this PD. Currently, we have implementations of two PDKs, based on [4, 19] . The PDs in these two PDKs use two or three parties, respectively.
Our compiler can successfully translate polymorphic code to bytecode that is targeted to both protection domains. This code can successfully be executed on our runtime and tests show that the execution and results are correct for both domains.
Conclusion
Efficient combining of different SMC techniques is crucial for obtaining acceptable performance for privacy-preserving outsourced computations. Equipping the programmer with easy-to-use tools to guide the combination is a big step towards this. In this paper, we have presented a language that allows fine-grained orchestration of different techniques with minimum effort by the programmer. A Dynamic Semantics of the Polymorphic Language
A.1 Expressions
The transition rules for expressions (Fig. 3 ) are in form γ e ⇒ d v . The expression evaluation rules can only be applied to expressions with fully evaluated subexpressions. The rules are completely standard. Function calls are handled by statement evaluation rules. 
A.2 Statements
Transition rules for statements (Fig. 4) are either in the form ∆ C, s κ → C , s or, if evaluation of the statement halts, in the form ∆ C, s κ → C . Most rules are fairly standard and we only highlight some of them. Throughout this section we denote pairs that consist of protection domain d and environment γ with just γ. Every rule apart from the one for system calls and the one for function calls passes the protection domain along with the environment. We have also omitted the program P from the context of every rule.
∆ γ, while e do s → γ, if e then (s ; while e do s) else skip If a return statement, with evaluated sub-expression, is reached within arbitrary statement evaluation context. The top-most stack frame is removed, and the value is inserted into the evaluation context of the caller. The current statement evaluation context is discarded entirely.
System calls are somewhat similar to return statement, but have the effect of calling the system function with currently active stack frame. The system call gets entire stack frame as argument which is unpacked to fit the form defined previously. For environment γ = ε[
A.3 Function Calls
Function calls -with fully evaluated parameters -are handled by statement evaluation rules. If such function call is reached within some statement evaluation context S the statement evaluation context will be pushed onto the return stack, the rule transitions into evaluating the function body, and new stack frame is constructed. The new environment within the stack frame maps the formal parameters to the values of the actual parameters.
The appropriate protection domain of the return type is selected dynamically using judgments in the form γ d S : d (see Fig. 6 ), where d is the current domain context. The judgment will match with every possible security domain d that the evaluation context can reside in. The rule for function call could lead to ambiguous behaviour but all function calls of an unambiguously-typed program can be evaluated unambiguously.
. Polymorphic language function call evaluation The evaluation of expressions is defined in Fig. 7 . 
C Translation Rules
See Fig. 9 for translation rules from polymorphic language to monomorphic language.
D Proof of Information Flow Security
The initial state w ∈ W of the environment of the program P is distributed according to W. The adversary is assumed to know the low-part w L of the initial state. During the execution of P , the adversary is also assumed to see the low-slice of the label of each occurring transition.
γ, if false then s1 else s2 → γ, s2 γ, while e do s → γ, if e then (s ; while e do s) else skip
Fig. 8. Monomorphic language statement evaluation rules
Besides the low-slices of transition labels and traces (according to the partitioning PD L∪ PD H of the set of protection domains PD), we can also speak about low-slices of program configurations. Recall that a program configuration is a pair C, s or an item C, where s is a statement (Sect. 3.1) and C is a sequence (S 1 , d 1 , γ 1 ) : · · · : (S n , d n , γ n ) : (d n+1 , γ n+1 ), where n ≥ 0, S i is a statement evaluation context (Fig. 2) , d i is the protection domain of the value to be returned from this frame and γ i is a mapping from variables to values annotated with protection domains. All values appearing in s and S i are annotated with their protection domains as well. To form the low-slice C, s or C, we replace all annotated values d v in s and S i with the placeholders d * , if d ∈ PD H . We have, that the low-slice of the execution of the program P can be recovered from the low-slices of the labels of the transitions taken during the execution.
Lemma 2. Let P be a well-typed program and C
Proof. The low-slice of a context contains full information about the control flow of the program, hence C
• 1 and C
• 2 both make the same step. If it is an assignment of a value to a variable (or to an array element), and the assigned value has a low protection domain, then the value must be the same in C 
. . , dn), ∆; θ f g} ∆; P ; ⊥ ⊥; ∅ body(P ) B ∆ P pdk(P ) pd(P ) F B ∆; P ; d0 t0; Γ, x1 : d1 t1, . . . , xn : dn tn s s G {x1 : d1 t1; . . . ;xn : dn tn; s} {x1 : d1 t1; . . . ;xn : dn tn; s } Γ = x1 : d1 t1, . . . , xn : dn tn ∆; P ; d0 t0; Γ syscall(f ) syscall(f, d0, d1, . . . , dn) ∆; P ; ret • 2 make a function call or return a value, then the passed values are either equal (if they have low protection domains) or replaced with the placeholder in the low-slice (if they have high protection domains). A low-security value returned from a system call can be found from the low-slice of the labels κ 1 and κ 2 .
For each possible initial environment w ∈ W, the semantics f of the system calls f and the program P uniquely determine the trace (an element of P ) of the execution. Denote this trace by Tr · (w, P ). Let T be the set of all low-slices of transition labels. For each T ∈ T * and each w L ∈ W L , let I
T ,w L P be the set of possible initial environments, the low-part of which is w L and the execution from which starts with transitions, the low-slices of which make up T . Formally,
where denotes that a sequence is a prefix of the other one. The knowledge of an adversary observing the execution of P is characterized by a probability distribution KN T ,w L P obtained by projecting W to I T ,w L P
. To project a probability distribution D ∈ D(X) to a set Y ⊆ X means setting the probabilities of all x ∈ X\Y to 0 and rescaling the probabilities of all x ∈ X, such that their sum is still equal to 1. After observing the prefix of the trace T and knowing that the low-part of the initial environment was equal to w L , the adversary knows that the initial environment had to belong to the set I T ,w L P . The relative probabilities of the elements in this set are the same as their relative probabilities in W.
The set of possible initial states is not changed by observing the low-slice of one more transition, unless it is a declassification transition. Namely, Lemma 3. Let w L ∈ W l , T ∈ T * and κ ∈ T , such that κ is not a declassification label. Then either I
T ;κ,w L P = I
T ,w L P or I
T ;κ,w L P = ∅.
Proof. We first note that the low-slice of the program context and the low-part of the environment are the same for all w ∈ I T ,w L P after the execution that produces the trace with the low-slice κ. Indeed, they do not depend on w at the beginning of the execution (the low-part of the environment is w L and the low-slice of the context is empty) and, according to Lemma 2, the contexts stay equal after each step of the program. Similarly, the low-part of the environment in different executions evolves in the same way (due to the constraints placed on the semantics of the system calls, its changes can be deduced from the low-slice of the execution trace).
We now note that the low-slice of the current program context, as well as the low-part of the current environment determine the low-slice of the label of the next transition, unless this label is a declassification label. Indeed, the current program point is uniquely determined, hence it is determined whether the next transition is silent or a system call f (d 0 , d 1 v 1 , . . . , d n v n ). If it is a system call then the domains d 0 , . . . , d n are determined by the low-slice of the program context. In the low-slice of the label κ of the next transition, the values v 1 , . . . , v n are included if the corresponding domains d 1 , . . . , d n are in PD L . In this case, these values can be found from the low-slice of the program context. If some d i is in PD H , then only a placeholder is included in κ instead of the value v i . The value v 0 returned by the system call is included in κ only if d 0 ∈ PD L . In this case, v 0 can be computed from the values v i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) included in κ and the low-part of the current environment. The low-part of the environment after this step can also be computed from the same values and the low-part of the current environment.
As κ is uniquely determined, we have I
T ,w L P if κ = κ , and
Considering the definition of KN T ,w L P , the previous lemma immediately implies Proposition 2. Let w L ∈ W l , T ∈ T * and κ ∈ T , such that κ is not a declas-
